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A detailed examination of the existing Naval Air Systems
Command Common Ground Support Equipment replacement model is
presented. Basic existing equipment replacement models are
discussed and the Annual Cost Model is selected as being
most applicable to Navy needs. Model inputs, consisting of
both empirical data and assumptions are critically examined
to determine the reasons for the observed limited program
utility. Several areas for future research are also suggested
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The Department of Defense (DOD) has long enjoyed the
reputation of being an innovator in new management techniques.
Operations Research, Linear Programming, Computerized Produc-
tion Scheduling, Organizational Development and a host of
other current industrial programs have had their genesis in
the Department of Defense.
One such technique although not originated within DOD,
has been used and promoted in DOD in recent years and
promises to enjoy a re-birth in the private sector. Equipment
Replacement theory was baptized shortly after World War II
and has been embraced only recently by the three services.
Equipment Replacement theory involves one type of a
capital investment decision process, deciding whether an
asset should be retained for a longer period of time or
replaced. The basic question to be resolved is when should
an existing equipment be replaced from an economic point of
view. A good replacement policy requires not only a good
methodology, but also it needs a good organization to
administer the policy with the support of top management.
The methodology involves historical data collection and use
of mathematical models, both of which will be addressed in
detail in this work.

Professor John I. S. Hsu of Villanova University
conducted a survey of private-sector equipment replacement
practices in 1974 (Hsu) . In this survey, Professor Hsu
reviewed forty-six of the largest manufacturing firms in the
nation and determined that twenty-four (52%) of the companies
did have a firm replacement policy and used a specific
formula. The other twenty-two firms did not have a company
policy, but used subjective judgement. Perhaps of greatest
interest to the military, is the information tabulated in
Tables I and II.
TABLE I
ELEMENTS USED IN THE EVALUATION OF REPLACEMENT CYCLE
Element Number of Firms
1. Repair & Maintenance Costs 24
2. Cost of Downtime 19
3. Revenue 16
4. Obsolescence factor 12
5. Acquisition cost 10




8. Inflation Rate 1
Note: 1. Elements not mutually exclusive.
2. Each firm used a combination of elements.

TABLE II
THE PROBLEMS OF DETERMINING ECONOMIC LIFE
The Most Difficult Problem Number of Firms
1. Forecast of Technological Change 9
2. Accuracy of cost data 5
3. Estimate of equipment utilization 3
4. Measurement of indirect savings 2





These elements considered so important in the private sector
are also of great concern to the military and represent,
indirectly, the purpose for this thesis.
The Navy has an equipment replacement policy for several
equipment types, such as Construction Equipment, Material-
handling equipment and Common Ground Support Equipment (CGSE)
.
(Defense) It is this last category which this work will
address. As a specific example of this type of equipment
The TA-75, a self-propelled aircraft tow tractor will be
used. The Navy uses the TA-75 and JG-75 for towing medium-
weight aircraft ashore. A similar unit, the MD-3, is used
aboard aircraft carriers. Large aircraft are towed on shore

by TA-18s, TA-180s and WLF-18s - all essentially identical
units.
There are four models of TA-75s: The United TA-75,
TA-75A, TA-75B and the Hough TA-75. The JG-75 has three
models: The JG-75, JG-75-1 and JG-75-2. TA-75s and JG-75s
are essentially similar, differing only in that the TA-75
is a newer, more versatile unit with a V-8 engine as opposed
to the 6-cylinder JG-75.
The Navy CGSE equipment replacement policy, implemented
by NAVAIRINST 4411.1 represents a first step in minimizing
the cost of CGSE ownership. The importance of such a policy
is readily understandable when one considers the cost of the
Navy CGSE. The Navy owns well over one hundred thousand
individual CGSE units, valued at over $2.5 billion. The
replacement cost of these units ranges from a few dollars
to well over $1 million per unit. It is therefore not only
natural, but also imperative that the Navy devise a manage-
ment technique to minimize cost-of-ownership. Unfortunately,
the current policy does not fulfill the stated objectives.
1. Purpose
The objective of this study is to evaluate the Navy's
CGSE replacement policy and recommend changes to increase its
utilization and effectiveness. To accomplish this objective,
a thorough investigation of accepted equipment replacement
models is conducted. The need for a CGSE replacement model,
the theory and construction of representative models and
sensitivity analysis are investigated.

Finally, and most pertinent, the Navy's CGSE
replacement model is critically examined. The Naval Air
Systems Command's (NAVAIRSYSCOM) CGSE replacement policy
(currently referred to as the "Retirement Program") is
considered deficient in the following areas (page numbers
refer to applicable pages in this thesis)
:
a. The NAVAIR model requires certain assumptions which
may or may not be relevant, such as: (1) a certain
cost of capital, (2) zero salvage value, (3) rising
annual maintenance costs and (4) identical operator
cost between the old machine and its prospective
replacement (pages 21-23).
b. The model relies upon imperfect data as an essential
input parameter. Not only is the data inaccurate,
but it is also inconsistent: a crippling deficiency
(page 42 )
.
c. The current program does not sufficiently correlate
the replacement decision with the procurement process
(page 43) .
d. Fleet maintenance policies have a significant impact
upon the computed CGSE economic life. The current
program fails to integrate maintenance policy with
the replacement decision process (pages 44-48).
e. Procurement policies are driven by replacement
policies to a certain extent. The current replace-
ment policy fails to recognize the impact of other
older or similar equipments which serve as valid
10

alternates to the prime item on the actual replace-
ment action (page 48) .
f. A CGSE renewal (i.e. "make-like-new") action is not
accommodated by the current model . When a CGSE unit
is not in danger of becoming functionally obsolete,
the renewal action may enjoy a cost advantage over
replacement (pages 4 9-52)
.
g. The effects of reliability and maintainability
improvements inherent in the prospective replacement
are not considered adequately (page 49)
.
h. The critical aspects of timing and procurement lead
time are not sufficiently addressed (pages 53-55)
.
These deficiencies are reviewed in detail and





A. NEED FOR REPLACEMENT MODELS
Replacement models fall into two broad interlocking
categories depending upon the life pattern of the equipment
under study. The first model category considers equipment
that deteriorates over time; the second considers a unit
that fails completely and instantaneously. A spectrum of
possible equipment conditions may be envisioned which fall
between the two extremes cited above. When replacement is
being considered, evaluation must be performed to ensure
the benefits associated with a new replacement unit exceed
anticipated benefits of retaining the current asset. These
benefits are generally measured in terms of cost savings
over a specified time period. The success of a military
organization is measured not in terms of increased dollar
profits, but by the successful accomplishment of a mission
with minimum allocation of men, money and materials. With
this in mind, the successful military economic equipment
replacement model should predict replacement at the point
where manpower, material and money expenditures are minimized
while retaining the level of mission accomplishment desired.
Replacement of an asset before the unit is completely
worn out appears to be a prima facie contradiction to the
minimum operating cost theory in the sense that the unit
obviously is capable of some amount of future production
above the required level of mission accomplishment. The
12

reluctance to replace a physically satisfactory but
economically (men, money or material usage) inferior piece
of equipment is due in part to the fact that the decision
to replace is much more binding than the decision to continue
with the present asset. Another perceived detriment in
making the decision to replace an existing asset is that the
current on-hand asset is yielding a production that can be
renewed at any time whereas the decision to replace is a
commitment for a longer period into the future. In essence,
a "do-nothing" decision represents less obvious risk than
a decision to replace would represent. The following
represent the more common reasons precipitating replacement
actions. (Fabrycky)
1. Replacement Because of Inadequacy
An item of CGSE may be incapable of meeting the
changing demand required of it. This often is the effect
upon equipments that have a fixed capacity and changing
operational requirements begin to demand more capacity.
To illustrate, a motor may not be able to meet an increased
load or a TA-75 aircraft tow tractor may not be capable of
towing new types of heavier aircraft. In each case, the
piece of CGSE may be in excellent condition, but it now
must be considered for replacement due to the need for
greater capacity, or its failure to meet the new level of
mission effectiveness standards now required.
13

2. Replacement Because of Obsolescence
New equipment is continually being developed that
will perform the same function as existing CGSE items but
at substantial cost savings. When this is true, ceteris
paribus
,
the existing asset should be replaced because of
its technological obsolescence. The existing CGSE unit
may still be capable of performing the production demands
placed upon it without incurring excessive maintenance cost
and may still be operating at a satisfactory level of operating
efficiency. If, however, an economic savings in manpower,
monies or material can be gained by replacement, then the
existing item of CGSE should be retired.
3. Replacement Because of Excessive Maintenance
Items of CGSE rarely incur uniform wear. Individual
CGSE components are likely to deteriorate faster and fail
before others. Under these conditions, it is often the
economical solution to repair the component and extend the
useful life of the asset. Diverse types and degrees of
maintenance and repair, coupled with widely-ranging costs,
may dictate replacement as an attractive economic alternative
as opposed to repair.
At a certain point in an asset's life, the antici-
pated repair cost should be compared with the expected
replacement cost, especially when these repairs can be viewed
as extensive and/or additional and excessive repairs are
foreseeable. The alternative possessing the lowest cost
14

should be selected. This replacement has a weakness in
that although it will identify the time period for which
the lowest equivalent average annual cost occurred, it
does not necessarily follow that the greatest economy would
have occurred at the minimum point indicated. This result
would totally depend upon the cost and characteristics of
the replacement item of CGSE.
4
.
Replacement Because of Declining Efficiency
Equipment generally operates at an initial peak
efficiency, but through th* passage of time and as a conse-
quence of usage, the efficiency gradually declines. The
reduction in efficiency may require increased power consump-
tion and longer use to accomplish the same operation or
mission. This generally results in increased operational
cost and can be therefore analyzed in a similar manner as
those items requiring replacement because of excessive
maintenance.
5. Replacement Under Inflation and Increased Productivity
Inflation and increased productivity are realities
that play an important part in the decision environment.
Although both may have an effect upon the procurement and
use of CGSE, they are usually disregarded in replacement
models, because of their unpredictability. When it can be
assumed that the rate of inflation and increased productivity
are consistent rather than sporadic over time, their effects
can and should be made part of the decision for equipment
replacement. For the TA-75, future procurements will likely
15

involve units basically similar to the existing unit.
Therefore, no significant productivity increase in envisioned
In view of the net mission requirements of the Navy remaining
status quo or increasing with a boundary applied to the
resources available to perform the mission required, two
different meanings may be applied to increased productivity:
(1) a decrease in the men, monies and materials input to
obtain a constant output, or (2) an increase in output
resulting from the same amount of men, monies and materials
input. Evaluation of inflation and increased productivity
disclose that inflation with no increase in productivity
will result in equipment replacement before the service
life is obtained. Inflation with increasing productivity
reverses the effects of inflation and causes a replacement
policy favoring the use of equipment until the end of their
service life (Fabrycky)
.
The difficulty in applying this model to a military
environment is that the model requires quantitative money
figures instead of incommensurables such as mission
performance.
B. STANDARD REPLACEMENT MODELS
Six comprehensive methods are used today as a means to
determine the time at which capital equipment should be
replaced (NAEC REPORT - Rhoades) . They are:
1. Annual Cost Method
2. Present Worth Method
3. Rate of Return Method

4. The First MAPI (Machinery and Allied Products Institute)
Method
5. The Second MAPI Method
6. The Third MAPI Method
All of these methods involve comparing the documented cost
of the old machine with the expected cost of the replacement.
Costs, however, are seldom uniform. Furthermore, some costs
are present-day costs and some are anticipated future costs.
To further complicate the issue, the time-value of money
must be considered. A dollar today is worth one dollar.
At an assumed interest rate of 10%, a dollar today is worth
$1.10 a year from now. A dollar cost anticipated to be
incurred one year from now represents a present cost of
$0.91. Therefore, in evaluating the costs and benefits
associated with each alternative, the present and future
value of money must be accounted for, as well as ensuring
that each equipment is evaluated on the same basis; i.e.,
non-uniform disbursements must be converted to uniform
disbursements to standardize the comparison.
1. The MAPI Methods
The three MAPI methods were developed primarily for
use in evaluating machine tools and exhibit their full
potential in that context.
MAPI assumes that certain operational costs begin
to rise linearly starting with the first year; the rate
of rise being termed the gradient. The MAPI method is the
only method which assumes non-uniform disbursements increase
17

linearly. For factory machine tools, this assumption is
valid. For GSE, it is not. In comparing the old machine
(defender) with the new machine (challenger) , the savings
in operating cost that would be realized should the replace-
ment be effected is divided by the age of the defender.
This quotient is considered the gradient for the challenger.
Using this gradient then, the planner calculates the lowest
uniform annual average cost to determine the new economic
life of the challenger. The cost-linearity assumption
and the use of arithmetic averages for exponential curves
limit the use of the MAPI method for GSE retirement and
will not be considered further. The second and third MAPI
methods use discounted cash flows, assumed earnings (reven-
ues) and figures-of-merit, further limiting their applica-
bility to the GSE situation.
2 . The Annual Cost Method
The Annual Cost Method, Present Worth Method and
Rate of Return Method are all general methods and are based
on the same assumptions. Their differences lie in the
method by which the same final results are presented. Since
the three methods yield the same results, only the annual
cost method will be examined to determine its essential
parameters.
The uniform annual cost method consists of:
1. Listing all costs affecting a comparison between
the old and new machines.
2. Using the past history of the old machine to predict
future costs of both machines.
i a

3. Converting present and future costs into uniform
annual costs (disbursements) for each year of the possible
service life.
4. Summing the annual costs for each year of the
possible service life.
5. Choosing the least-cost alternative.
Generally, the uniform annual cost method as
implemented by NAVAIR assumes (1) the same operational cost
for each machine (thus eliminating operational cost as a
differential cost, in the accounting sense)
, (2) no salvage
value for either machine, (3) a continuing need for the
service the machine performs and (4) the maintenance costs
for each year are higher than the preceding year. These
assumptions are not basic to the model developed, however,
and each assumption may be eliminated or modified without
degrading the model validity. The term "operational cost"
used above refers to the labor cost of operating the machine.
Initially, the acquisition cost of the new machine
must be prorated over the engineering service life to effect
a comparison between the old and new machine. If the
time-value of money is ignored, the average capital cost of
a $1000 machine over two years is $500. However, if money
costs 10%, the average cost becomes $576 per year ($1000
x .576). Thus, considering that there is a time-value to
money, the average capital cost over a specified period of
time is determined by multiplying the acquisition cost by a
capital recovery factor, which is the amount of an annuity

(equal payment) paid over that specified period and whose
present value is one dollar. Table III illustrates the
difference caused by considering the time-value of money.
TABLE III PRORATING ACQUISITION COSTS
YEARS CAPITAL RECOVERY FACTOR CAPITAL RECOVERY
% Interest 10% 0% 10%
1 1.000 1.100 $1000 $1100
2 0.500 0.576 500 576
3 0.333 0.402 333 402
It is significant at this point to distinguish
between "service life" and "economic life". Service life
is determined by the manufacturer's engineers as a physical
expected useful life based upon average maintenance prac-
tices. Economic life is a computed length of time, at
the end of which the total average annual cost is at its
minimum point. Exceeding the service life is to invite
eventual degredation of physical utilization. Overhaul or
extensive repair can temporarily extend the service life,
however. Exceeding the economic life results in a higher
total average annual cost. No mechanism is available to
extend the economic life: further operation of the equip-
ment can only result in higher costs, given the general
model characteristics cited herein.
20

The generally accepted relevant costs for the
annual cost method are maintenance costs and capital
recovery costs. The model may be expanded, however, by
assuming (correctly) that gas and oil consumption increases
with age, operator wages increase yearly and parts cost
increase with the passage of time. Furthermore, the rates
of increase will differ between the old and new machines.
Inflation rates may be assumed if the planner has reason
to suspect the rates in future years will be significant.
Possibly the best way to illustrate the method is
to present an example. Assume the existing equipment is
five years old and the rising cost of operating and main-
taining the machine have become substantial. Further cost
can be avoided if the old machine is replaced by a similar
new machine. A capital expense will be incurred upon
delivery of the new machine. Both operational and main-
tenance costs will be incurred in the following years.
The anticipated yearly costs will be non-uniform and not
entirely predictable, but are based upon previous documented
experience with the old machine.
The following assumptions apply to the new machine
where the cost of capital is not considered.
a. Operations Cost: assumed to be $4000 for the
first year for gas, oil and operator salary.
This figure is inflated at 4% per year and
y% per year added to reflect decreased fuel
economy and increased oil consumption.
21

b. Maintenance Cost: Assumed to be $1200 for the
first year. Figure inflated 4% and 4% added
per year to reflect increasing maintenance cost
due to wear, tear and age.
c. Book Value: Initial acquisition cost assumed
to be $9000. Economic life established by
NAVAIR set at 10 years.
d. Salvage Value: "Blue Book" concept is used in
that the resale value is assumed to decrease
exponentially with time. Salvage (resale)
-0 23t
value assumed to be S = 5000 e ' which
n
assumes the $9,000 unit could be sold immed-
iately after purchase for $5,000 and for $500
at the end of 10 years.
Table IV tabulates values to construct Figure 1.
The tabulated values satisfy the equation
P _ s
" COj+ M.)




P = purchase price
S = Salvage value in year "n"
= Operations cost
M = Maintenance cost
22

n = end of year "n 1
ATC = Average total annual cost over n years
The point at which the lowest uniform average cost
occurs for the new machine is seen to be 6 years, and the
average annual cost over its economic life is approximately
$7235 per year. The economic life for the new machine is
therefore computed to be 6 years.
If the time value of money (capital) is considered
for the same machine, a different economic life is obtained.
Using the same assumptions, but additionally assuming a
10% cost of capital, the values seen in Table V and Figure
2 are obtained. The economic life is now observed to be
» 7 years and the total Equivalent Annual Cost is approximately
$7735.
The tabulated values in Table V satisfy the
equation
S n . . +M
.
, . , ,
.
. v n
EAC = P - 2— + I LJ—21 iJi+i>
n ° (l+i) n j=l (l+i) D (l+i) n-l
where EAC = Equivalent Annual Cost over n years.
i = Discount Rate (DOD cost of capital, 10%)
The other symbols are identical to those in Figure 1
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FIGURE 2. General Cost Model, Exponential Salvage Value,
Discounted 10%

Discounting all costs to present values results
generally in keeping the unit longer than one would if
costs were not discounted. As may be seen in Figure 2,
the equivalent annual cost reaches a minimum at about 7
years instead of the 6 years shown in Figure 1. Shamblin
and Stevens point out that discounting to present values
is generally only significant when the discount rate is
20% or greater, or, the initial investment cost is very
large (Shamblin)
.
The costs used to construct Figures 1 and 2 are not
entirely unreasonable but were arbitrarily selected. In
actual practice, the Navy Supply Systems Command purchases
bit and piece repair parts on a volume basis; thus, the
maintenance costs may not follow a linear inflation curve.
Rather, the inflationary effects may be visible only at such
times a large purchase is made — every 4 or 5 years in some
cases. Additionally, the salvage value was assumed to
decrease exponentially and the exponents were chosen to
provide a $500 salvage value at the end of 10 years. Actual
salvage values of a TA-75 are available from the Defense
Disposal Command but determining the age of any specific
unit salvaged is difficult with existing data. The units
surveyed are generally deteriorated to the extent that their
worth is simply the worth of an equivalent weight of steel




Although the replacement model presented in
Figures 1 and 2 is a simple and effective device for least-
annual-cost determination, recent world-wide economic events
have precipitated a more intensive examination of existing
predictive models. So-called double digit inflation is so
rare as to be considered an improbable event in the United
States. However, a long-term decline of a high inflation
rate or short-term dramatic fluctuations in the inflation
rate cause significant problems in replacement models,
particularly when the model is not continually revised.
As stated previously, Figures 1 and 2 represent the
general replacement (cost) models for a unit such as the
TA-75, using both the average and discounted annual costs.
In each case the salvage value was assumed to be exponen-
tially decreasing — a characteristic common to automotive-
type equipment. Figure 3 and Table VI display the difference
caused by assuming no salvage value but discounting at 10%.
In Figure 2, the average annual cost over 6 years is $7735
per year. In Figure 3, the lowest total equivalent annual
cost occurs at approximately 8 years and approximately
$7810 per year. Thus the zero salvage value assigned to the
Figure 3 model tends to increase the average annual cost.
The 8-year economic life in Figure 3 is a combined result
of the 10% discounting and the zero salvage value.
Turning now to a more realistic example, Figures 4
and 5 and Tables VII and VIII display the effects of a
constant $500 salvage value with zero and 10% discounting
29

respectively. The major effect of the constant salvage
value is to increase the economic life over that of Figures 1
and 2. This occurs primarily as a consequence of the flatter
capital recovery curve resulting from an exponentially-
decreasing salvage value presumed in Figures 1 and 2. The
differences between Figures 4 and 5 are due solely to the
discounting variations previously cited.
To this point, the discussion has centered about the
minimum annual cost for the new machine. The existing
machine, which will be replaced when economically feasible
to do so, continues to accumulate costs annually. The
NAVAIR method of computing the time at which the replacement
should occur is depicted in Table IX. The Total Equivalent
Annual Cost (TEAC) of the new machine is listed for each
year of ownership in column 12. Column 13 is the annual
average documented cost for the old machine. Obviously, the
year in which the comparison is made is of paramount impor-
tance. As an example of comparison, consider the following:
a. Characteristics of the new machine are assumed
identical with those used to construct Figure 2
and Table V.
b. Assume the old machine has been in service for 5 full
years (i.e. new machine year 1 = old machine year 6)
.
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Entering these costs for the defender on the Table IX
worksheet, and remembering that "now" is challenger year zero
and end of defender year five, the average annual defender
maintenance cost for the end of challenger year 3 exceeds
the challenger TEAC for the end of year 3 (Defender year 8)
.
Thus, this analysis indicates a replacement must be on-board
by the start of challenger year 3, corresponding to the end
of defender year 7 to take advantage of the minimum cost.
If this type of analysis is conducted yearly, it is
theoretically possible to provide for a replacement far
enough in advance to compensate for procurement lead time.
The salvage value of either machine can be an
important parameter and can be considered in several ways.
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not realized, thus representing a revenue foregone. Also,
the future salvage value of a machine represents a future
revenue which has a present value and serves to reduce the
capital recovery costs. However, differences in cash flow
before taxes will not be influenced by past investments in
assets considered for retirement, as a general rule. Past
capital expenditures should therefore be considered irrele-
vant and not as revenues foregone since military capital
investments are not taxed and do not suffer depreciation
(Grant and Ireson)
.
In making decisions on whether or not to continue
an asset in service, the capital costs of extending its
service should be based on its present net salvage value at
the end of the anticipated service extension. An alternative
method is to assume zero capital costs for the defender and
subtract the present net defender salvage value from the
challenger's contract price before computing challenger
capital costs. In this method, the capital recovery costs
are based on the amount of new monies required rather than
on the total investment (Grant and Ireson) . This is the
method used in the annual cost method previously described
and illustrated by Figure 2 and Table V.
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III. THE CURRENT CGSE RETIREMENT PROGRAM
The Naval Air Systems Command CGSE Retirement Program
outlined in NAVAIRINST 4411.1 (Commander, 1971) contains
specific responsibilities for primary action and supporting
commands. NAVAIR (AIR-417), is assigned the overall
responsibility for the CGSE retirement program. They are
responsible for the determination of policy and the coordina-
tion between the Type Commanders, Aviation Supply Office,
and the Naval Air Systems Command Representative's efforts.
AIR-417 submits a list of equipments to be retired in the
succeeding fiscal year. An additional list is required of
equipment that is forecast to be retired in the budget year
and for the budget year plus one. Requirements for replace-
ment equipment are computed and submitted to the CGSE
Acquisition Manager, NAVAIR-534.
NAVAIR (AIR-534) allocates the CGSE procurement funds to
provide a balanced inventory. AIR-534 also provides distribu-
tion instructions for the procuring activity based upon
retirement data furnished by AIR-417.
Naval Air Engineering Center (NAEC) develops criteria
based upon cost-analysis techniques which are the basis upon
which retirement decisions are made. NAEC also reviews the
3-M data and depot-level data pertinent to the retirement
program and functions as the technical advisor to the NAVAIR
retirement program coordinator assigned by AIR-417. Retirement
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lists are submitted annually to the Program Coordinator
identifying the type equipment code, serial number, and the
current custodian of CGSE units that have exceeded their
economic life as determined from MDCS data for each unit
and the theoretical annual cost model calculations for each
type unit.
Naval Air System Command Representatives (NASCREPS)
provide the depot level data and commercial rework data
needed for the CGSE retirement program. In conjunction with
the Type Commanders, NASCREPS authorize local survey or
shipment to a depot level activity for cannibalization.
Type Commanders allocate new and in-use assets to preclude
shortages created by the retirement of specific serial-
numbered units.
Aviation Supply Office (ASO) provides the distribution
for replacement CGSE units. ASO prepares budgets and initiates
procurement actions for replacement items of CGSE nominated
for retirement under its management cognizance.
The CGSE retirement program is based upon data derived
from the MDCS. The retirement decision criteria developed




IV. CGSE RETIREMENT PROGRAM PROBLEMS
Any policy employing a model such as the ones described
herein is effective only to the extent logisticians adhere
to that policy. Unfortunately, for a variety of reasons,
the current CGSE Retirement program has been only partially
effective.
This system or any other system must have as its corner-
stone a sound base upon which the system decisions are made.
The Maintenance Data Collection System (MDCS) for CGSE is
manipulated for local purposes as well as being susceptible
to erroneous higher level interpretation. In addition it is
highly susceptible to human data-entry errors.
In recent reports, the JG-75 had a 38% reporting error
in valid meter hours and the TA-75 had a 2 4% reporting error
in valid hour meters. (NAEC 1973, NAEC 1975) Only those
units with reported valid meter readings are used for input
to the model. With a 24% to 38% error in only one specific
reported item, the accuracy of remaining data entries must
be questioned.
The MDCS was designed as a data collection system to
manage aircraft maintenance. MDCS easily accommodates the
three-levels-of-maintenance concept but is not entirely
compatible with CGSE maintenance policy which more nearly
resembles a two-level concept (Organizational/Intermediate-
Level and Depot-Level) . As a consequence of this
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incompatibility, source data is often entered incorrectly
simply due to a lack of applicable provisions for this
unique situation. The collated data available to upper
management is in turn subject to misinterpretation.
Another serious deficiency in the current CGSE retire-
ment program is the lack of coordination between the
retirement decision-making process and the procurement
process. Since the existing model is exercised for each
individual serial-numbered unit, a replacement should
theoretically be provided for each retirement decision.
Basic procurement economics, however, dictate that some
economic order quantity (EOQ) be established to minimize
contract and set-up costs and also to take advantage of any
learning curve benefits. The EOQ consideration dictates
that some units must be retained beyond the point at which
the minimum total average annual cost is attained. This
situation is not untenable, provided the replacement action
does not consume an unreasonable amount of time.
Beyond a certain undefined economic life extension,
however A the model developmental and operational cost rapidly
transcends expected benefits. Additionally, enthusiastic
participation in assuring source data accuracy will be
mitigated if timely equipment replacements are not experienced.
Another major problem that is associated with this cost
model or any other model that may be developed for common
ground support equipment is that the dollar expenditures
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documented for CGSE often do not reflect the actual amount
expended or the circumstances that precipitated the
expenditures
.
As examples consider: (1) the case of several units
that are in a repair state causing the remaining operating
units to fulfill all the requirements. This would cause the
operating costs of these few operating units to be higher
than average and (2) the dollars actually spent per unit
come from many different "pots of money" and there does not
currently exist a means of determining what funds were
actually spent on a particular end item of CGSE. The dollars
actually expended to repair an item of CGSE will be differ-
ent based upon where and by whom the unit was repaired.
If the Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Department (AIMD)
initiates and completes the repair totally within and by
means of its own facilities, the documented costs will
generally be accurate. These costs will be the sum of
the labor cost, consumable materials used and/or the cost
of replacement components.
Given the present retirement program methodology and
model parameters, a repair which involves removal and
replacement of a component at the I-Level (AIMD) and com-
ponent repair at the D-Level (Naval Air Rework Facility —
NARF) will also result in generally accurate model inputs.
AIMDs , however, have other means available to restore
a unit to operating condition. A component may be canni-
balized from another inoperative unit, for example. If
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the proper code is not entered on the Maintenance Action
Form, NAEC can only interpret the action as dollars spent
on a new component from stock. The net effect is a double
cost for one purchased component. Further, the AIMD may
send a defective component to a commercial firm for repair.
The removal and replacement time would likely be documented
correctly. The component overhaul cost would not be docu-
mented in the MDCS. This cost will either be lost to the
system or be assigned an incorrect value at NAEC.
Navy activities have several funds available to effect
repairs. Although funds are allocated for specific pur-
poses, an energetic logistician will generally use any
fund available to increase operational readiness. There
being no established procedure to document these expendi-
tures (even if the individual wanted to disclose his
ingenuity), the expenditures are lost as model inputs.
Components salvaged from surveyed units likewise are
not entered into the system at their true cost. This lack
of uniform cost accountability for specific CGSE units
causes the cost replacement model to yield inaccurate
results.
Additive to the problem of incorrect dollar repair bills
being reported for each unit is the problem of data time-
liness. As with any information system, the cost to obtain
rapid and accurate information increases as the speed and
accuracy requirements likewise increase. The problem that
45

arises using MDCS data is that cost data is not required
to be submitted until the repair action is complete.
Numerous items are cannibalized from one unit to repair
many other CGSE units. The component cost will show upon
the robbed unit when in fact the cost is caused by other
units. The cannibalized unit may also remain in this
robbed-of-parts condition indefinitely since there is no
requirement to report units which have been inoperative for
an excessive period of time. Meanwhile, the unit can
continue to incur costs that do not get reported into the
system. In addition, literally years may go by before the
CGSE unit that has exceeded its economic life is, if ever,
replaced. To illustrate, a unit whose uniform annual cost
is approaching the threshold for retirement, goes hard down
for a major component. Since the specific component is not
in stock, several similar units are repaired with parts
cannibalized from the inoperative unit in order to meet
"operational" requirements. Eventually all the parts are
received, the inoperative unit is placed back into operation
and the data enters the system months after being initially
generated. The information for this particular serial-
numbered unit finally reaches NAEC which determines that the
cost now makes this unit a candidate for retirement. The
unit must now be reported as a unit that needs replacement.
However, by instruction, the list of units to be replaced
is an annual list which could have been just published.
Therefore it will be another year before this unit will be

placed on the list of units requiring a replacement. If
there are not enough like units to trigger the procurement
(i.e. the EOQ threshold is attained) the unit will continue
to be used for a longer, indeterminate time.
Equipment maintenance policies have a direct bearing on
equipment retirement and replacement actions and the total
cost of owning a particular piece of equipment. Currently,
the Navy specifies a preventative maintenance (PM) policy
that requires periodic maintenance and inspections even if
there is no apparent need. Although the need for routine
inspection is accepted (check the oil level, tire pressure,
water levels) , the forced repair or replacement of parts
based only on hours or usage frequency should be evaluated
frequently. In a recent work (Brosh) , the optimal policy
was determined to be replacement/repair of components only
upon failure. This result was obtained when a comparison of
the following five maintenance policies were investigated
for a fleet of vehicles: (1) replace components upon failure,
(2) planned replacement of components irrespective of age at
predetermined intervals, with no information available as to
life distribution, (3) replacement as in the second case,
but based upon valid information. When the unit is called
in for repairs, the component is replaced. (4) Unplanned
replacement of subsets of components irrespective of age
whenever a failure occurs and (5) unplanned replacement of
a subset of components based upon an age limitation.
Another similar view (ARORA) is stated as:
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. . . one can rationalize many maintenance practices
followed in real life. We can conceive of a
situation where it may be meaningful to provide
maximal (or minimal) maintenance in the beginning,
in the middle, toward the end or throughout the
life of the system. For example, in the case of
automobiles, it may be advisable to provide
maximal maintenance during the middle period.
Repair model utility is conditional upon the same factors
cited for the replacement models. The ultimate reasons for
PM are twofold: (1) cost is minimized and/or (2) operational
readiness (or availability) is maximized. If cost is the
prime consideration, the annual PM costs should exceed the
Corrective Maintenance (CM) costs. Should the reverse be
true, many factors could be responsible, but certainly the
PM policy and the repair model itself should be examined
carefully. In a recent study the Naval Air Engineering
Center (NAEC) studied 410 TA-75A/Bs and reported 24,641 total
days Not Operationally Ready (NOR) for maintenance (NAEC
1975). Of these, 3,995 days were for PM and 20,646 days were
for CM: a CM-to-PM ratio of 5.17 to one. The obvious
conclusion is that the Navy maintenance policy considers
availability the prime consideration with cost as a secondary
consideration. Telephone conversations with NAEC engineers,
however, confirm that in those cases where the Navy has a
large equipment inventory and a surplus over minimum opera-
tional requirements, the policy is to consider cost as the
paramount consideration.
Valid alternate items in the CGSE inventory complicate
use of the existing replacement model. The problem posed by
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these alternate items is that by their existence, procure-
ment action to replace retired CGSE is delayed since a unit
capable of performing most of the same functions is on hand.
Conversely a unit which has exceeded its model-determined
economic life may by the current directive be replaced even
though a perfectly acceptable alternate may be available.
The current model assumes that the cost projections for
the new unit will be similar to the documented costs of the
older unit. Unless allowances are made for inflationary
effects, technological improvements and anticipated
reliability differences, the computed economic life of the
replacement unit will have little relation to reality. As
a consequence of this comparison with faulty assumptions,
budgetary estimates may be significantly over or under-stated.
Unless the replacement unit is an exact duplicate of the
retired unit, the logistician faces a problem in predicting
future operating and maintenance costs for use in the model.
Since the basic reason for using a model is to compare the
cost of operating an old unit longer with the future cost of
a replacement item, any errors in predicting costs for the
new machine will result in an erroneous management decision.
The net result, of course, is that the old equipment may be
replaced too soon or too late. In either event, the decision
would not be optimal and avoidable costs would be incurred.
Another cost factor having a major impact on future cost
data for the system is the cost of making a unit like new —
i.e. a complete overhaul or "renewal". The current model
49

does address a situation involving the trade-offs between
a complete overhaul and a new procurement. To illustrate
the effect of a make-like-new policy on an existing equipment
model, consider Figure 6 which depicts a unit at the end of
its economic life T, and the expenditure of sufficient funds
to restore the unit completely. The effect, depending on
the cost of the overhaul, causes the average yearly cost to
decrease, thus increasing its life past T, to T„. The total
effect may be slight or significant depending upon the amount
of expense incurred to overhaul the unit, the age of the unit
at the time of overhaul, the original unit price and the
effect renewal has upon subsequent annual O&M costs. In any
event, the renewal policy should be examined as a viable
alternative to replacement.
Compounding the renewal policy problem, there appears to
be no limit as to the number of make-like-new repairs that a
unit could undergo before it becomes uneconomical to perform
the renewal action. The maintenance activity which determines
the unit is a good candidate for a successful renewal effort
does not have ready access to the accumulated maintenance
costs which serve as the primary model input. In the TA-75
example, the Operational Logistic Support Plan (OLSP)
specified only one overhaul for each unit, although the
criteria for that specification are not disclosed (NAVAL AIR,
1974) .
This rigid guidance does not provide for an investigation








Immediate identification and replacement at T-^








Renewal action at T, and resultant new (longer)
economic life.
Effect of complete renewal on annual cost of
ownership and length of economic life.
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extension through a renewal action. The projected cost of
a renewal is generally available only after the unit is
transported to a Naval Air Rework Facility (NARF) and an
Inspection and Evaluation (I&E) completed. Further, the
post-renewal annual maintenance cost is difficult to predict
but may be generally estimated to approximate new-unit costs
if these costs are available.
AIMDs and Depot activities use different methods to
document repair costs: the depot method being exogenous to
the MDCS and requiring a separate collection and evaluation
effort. An effort to include MDCS reporting as a NARF
requirement has been in process for several years, but
progress is slow.
CGSE may be overhauled legally by the AIMD custodian,
thus circumventing the one-overhaul rule as a result of a
unique provision in NAVAIR 4 790. 2A: this provision designates
certain large AIMDs as possessing the expertise and manpower
sufficiency to perform depot-level overhaul of engine,
transmission and drive-train components. The special
authorization (termed SX function) was intended to implement
the stated NAVAIR policy to perform maintenance at the lowest
feasible level. The costs are documented on a MAF and serve
as input to the model.
The model must be continually updated so as to reflect
the true acquisition price of the challenger when the
investigation to replace the old unit is made. This acquisi-
tion price must also be representative of the true procurement
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cycle, i.e. an educated assumption of economic factors such
as inflation must be applied to the estimated price at the
time the replacement will actually be made.
Procurement lead time and inflationary uncertainties
dictate the replacement would actually occur before the most
economic time in the unit's life-cycle.
If it were possible to identify the need for replacement
and immediately provide that replacement, the situation
depicted in Figure 7 would prevail. The total annual
equivalent cost experienced over the economic life of the
defender would be the optimum which could be realized.
Considering the normal procurement lead time, however,
if the realization of need for replacement occurs at T, and
the actual replacement occurs at T-, the TEAC experienced
over the defender's lifetime (M^) is clearly not optimal.
It is therefore apparent that some means must be available
to trigger an investigation into possible replacement action
well before time T,. Otherwise, it would be necessary to
conduct an analysis of each serial-numbered unit every year
after (say) the fourth year or so to ensure time T, is still
lead-time into the future.
Additionally, to insure model output viability, the
state-of-the-art with respect to reliability and maintaina-
bility must be monitored or estimated yearly. These factors
can have a significant impact upon the costs utilized in the
















a. Immediate replacement at end of economic life T^
- Time
b. Identification of end economic life (Tj_) and
replacement at time T 2 (procurement lead-time away)
FIGURE 7. Changes in TEAC caused by procurement delays.




Initially, the current NAVAIR model is used for only
five equipment categories. These are: mobile electric
power plants, air conditioners, liquid oxygen equipment,
hydraulic test stands and tow tractors. These five types
of equipments are in turn broken up into 7 9 type-equipment
codes representing 79 different models. The total actual
onhand inventory was, and is now, precisely unknown. The
NAVAIR retirement program directive requires that all CGSE
be eventually placed under the retirement program. In view
of the cost involved to exercise the model for existing
equipments and in view of the reservations presented herein,





There are pressing reasons from both an economic and
operational standpoint to replace aging CGSE with new
equipment. Determining the lowest annual cost of ownership
for existing equipment is extremely attractive particularly
in view of the public pressures to minimize defense
expenditures
.
Although it is mathematically attractive to predict
the minimum cost life (economic life) and operational
life (physical life) of an asset, it is more of an ideal
than a working reality.
The decision to replace CGSE is almost always made
just before the actual replacement or when the actual need
for a replacement unit if known as a result of factors that
are analyzed at the immediate time. This is done for a
number of reasons: first, the future cost data of a replace-
ment and in particular the maintenance cost are uncertain
factors when the asset is first obtained. Secondly, the
evaluation of the existing unit is dependent upon an imper-
fect data collection system. Thirdly, recent experience
with widely-fluctuating inflation rates almost mandates a
yearly assessment of the replacement status. Nonetheless,
determination of a minimum cost interval is possible
under certain conditions.
Assuming future asset costs can be predicted with a
reasonable degree of accuracy and assuming that the
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replacement CGSE will have characteristics identical to
the original unit, then consideration of only the main-
tenance cost will yield these results: (1) with a constant
annual maintenance cost or sporadic maintenance costs,
there will be no minimum annual average or equivalent annual
cost and thus, no specified economic life. (2) Only if the
documented annual maintenance cost rises each year will a
minimum occur to indicate minimum cost of ownership. When
there exists a predictable and rising trend in maintenance
cost, it is possible to formulate a model that may be used
to find the minimum cost replacement interval. It is this
model tha t the Naval Air Engineering Center uses for the
CGSE retirement program.
The current model, however, employs various assumptions
which may mitigate its value. The assumption that all
serial-numbered CGSE exhibit a rising annual maintenance
cost must be questioned. The effects of inflation are
recognized in the rate of interest chosen for the model,
but the maintenance and operating costs are not adjusted
for inflation prior to exercizing the model. The operational
costs are assumed identical for both the challenger and
the defender, thus eliminating them as differential costs
for the comparison. The combination of the inflation rate
and the time frame in which the comparison is made may
render this assumption invalid.
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The maintenance policy established for the unit is
extremely important to the computed economic life of either
the challenger or the defender. The engineered service
life of the asset is seen to have minimal importance in
the economic replacement decision. The number and frequency
of overhauls , whether minimum component overhauls or a
"make-like-new" renewal action, can extend the service life
of an asset and might be utilized as a least-cost alternative
to obviate replacement actions.
Existence of older alternatives to the prime CGSE unit
complicates the process of inventory validation and obscures
the obvious need for new procurement. Given the historical
concern for minimizing the budget, the obvious tendency is
to delay procurement until the operational need becomes
critical.
Without a strong, consistent link between retirement
decisions and procurement initiation, replacement modeling
can never assume a role of importance.
Fleet perceptions of untimely replacement actions and
inconsistent retirement decisions will serve to perpetuate
incorrect source data submissions and prevent strong fleet*
program support essential to the modeling viability.
While the NAVAIR program costs are not known, the
economic advantage of a modeling effort for such a wide
range of equipment types and models as compared to the
routine subjective evaluation of a fleet maintenance officer
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must be proved before the retirement model can be assumed
viable. While fleet personnel are not always aware of
impending obsolescence ten years hence, they are generally
capable of determining whether a unit is capable of
restoration or should be replaced (although they are
generally unaware of the long-term average annual cost
implications) .
Finally, the maintenance policies established for air-
craft tow tractors in particular, and CGSE in general, do
not appear to be sufficiently comprehensive and do not
appear to reflect the current national economic conditions.
Nor do they recognize the possibility that the unit may
well suffice functionally for generations of new aircraft
in the foreseeable future. Furthermore, the exhibited ratio
of PM/CM appears to be out of balance leading to the con-





The NAVAIR Retirement Program should be discontinued
and reviewed in its entirety. The model used is considered
adequate for certain CGSE units with the caveat that the
underlying assumptions must be carefully reviewed for
applicability. A procurement price threshold should be
established, below which the model will not be used. Exer-
cizing a model for CGSE originally costing less than the
system cost to generate the information is not considered
cost effective. Items of CGSE whose maintenance costs are
also less than the information systems generation cost should
be deleted to maintain a cost effective system.
Examination of other methods to indicate replacement
requirements should be undertaken. Considering the plethora
of low-cost CGSE, inclusion of these items in a formal
mathematical model would appear to have little utility.
This reservation would apply particularly to those equip-
ments which are simple tools, or non-motorized, portable
units. Replacement requirements for these equipments could
be initiated at the custodian level and passed via the
logistic chain of command to the NAVAIRSYSCOM.
The custodian could use methods such as the maintenance
cost per utilization hour, as documented in the MDCS , to
signal the requirement for a replacement request. When an
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Economic Order Quantity of replacement requests is accumu-
lated, NAVAIR could initiate procurement action.
Consideration should be given towards maintaining a
minimum ready stock of CGSE, and establishment of an inven-
tory model to minimize procurement delays associated with
the replacement decision (described on pages 43, 53,
and 54.
While the procurement program appears to be fully
capable of efficient, effective action, innovative procure-
ment techniques should be investigated to minimize delays
and costs. A continuous production contract with small
firms might possibly serve the purpose of replenishing
attritions and satisfying the inventory model. Further,
since large firms pay an economic penalty for such small
production, this action would be a naturally suitable
vehicle for government to assist small business.
The TYCOMs and major fleet users (particularly Naval
Air Stations) should be included in policy formulation dis-
cussions. Unique operating problems would then be con-
sidered and reconciled before implementation. As an exam-
ple, GSE MDCS reporting anomalies must be corrected before
any replacement model will enjoy validity. Prompt replace-
ments for equipment to be surveyed will automatically
serve to decrease reporting errors, but further emphasis
must be placed in this important area.
Finally, an investigation should be conducted into the
advisability of incorporating CGSE procurement, retirement
and replacement into a system which makes the user accountable
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for the economics of equipment utilization as well as
being accountable for the operational readiness. Current
budgetary responsibilities lie with the Systems Commands
who are assisted by inputs from the TYCOMs . The fleet,
in essence, has custody of a free good in the sense that
their only obligation is to operate within a specific
allocation of funds. By providing the fleet (possibly)
or the TYCOM (certainly) the information necessary to
optimize economic utilization of existing assets, these
activities will be induced to minimize capital and opera-
tional costs and will realize a commensurate increase in
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